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Revisiting the European Horsemeat Scandal: The Role of Power Asymmetry in the 
Food Supply Chain Crisis 
  
Abstract 
This study explores the role of power asymmetry in the food supply chain, especially in 
relation to the channel conflict, and ultimate breakdown that culminated in the infamous 
European horsemeat scandal across Europe. Drawing upon the power-dependency, and to 
some extent, social exchange theory, the study posits that mutual dependence between single 
supplier-multiple buyer relationships where major retailers are the weaker partners, may 
require a re-visitation of risk management practices in that sector. In addition to the 
fraudulent and unethical practices established from media reporting on the horsemeat scandal, 
the study argues that the power asymmetry/ imbalance may have contributed to a supplier 
culture that tolerated the unethical decision-making leading to the horsemeat scandal. Based 
on an extensive review of secondary data sources comprising media reports on the scandal 
and a review of the academic literature on power dependency and social exchange theories, 
the study attempts to map out the root of the crisis, how to forestall future recurrence, and the 
managerial and policy implications of these.  
Keywords:  Buyer/Supplier Relationships; Food supply chains; European Horsemeat 
Scandal, Power Asymmetry  
  
Introduction 
This study focuses on the overarching question of how firms deal with high power 
asymmetry in the supply chain. It explores, and highlights how retailers and suppliers in the 
food chain deal with power imbalance and mistrust. Specifically, the study explores the 
power dynamics between European supermarket giants and their lesser known suppliers in 
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the food supply chain involving, and especially so in the aftermath of the ‘horsemeat scandal’ 
(see Barnett et al., 2016; Madichie, 2015; Falkheimer and Heide, 2015; Yamoah and 
Yawson, 2014; Premanandh, 2013; O’Mahony, 2013; Hingley, 2005; Anderson and Lee, 
1978). Drawing extensively from Hingley (2005), the study explores the power relationships 
in food supply chains especially in instances where there are real or perceived control issues 
amongst large multiple retailers such as Tesco and their supplier partners. Such power 
dependent relationships are deemed significant in understanding the impact of relationship 
breakdowns on the general public as epitomised in the recent horsemeat scandal across 
Europe. The study puts forward two propositions. First, the typical power asymmetry 
associated with sole supplier-many buyer relationships in the meat supply chain 
systematically led to channel conflict and mistrust, and ultimately acted as a precursor to the 
infamous European horsemeat scandal. Second, in order to ward off another scandal or 
channel conflict, adopting and applying the ethos of power sharing and social exchange 
theories can help forestall recurrence. 
This study seeks to  understand, and explain the reasons for the horsemeat scandal 
across Europe (Barnett et al., 2016; Madichie, 2015; Falkheimer and Heide, 2015; Yamoah 
and Yawson, 2014) from power asymmetry perspective, and the supply chain implications of 
this – with calls for an alternative to the conventional supply chain (Madichie, 2015) and 
revisiting of the power relations (Hingley, 2005). This is particularly expedient in instances 
of food retailers (see Perez et al., 2010 for the case of Catalan pork) such as supermarkets 
with multiple suppliers in other non-food categories, but lower bargaining power in the food 
category – as a result of over reliance on a single supplier as epitomised by the horsemeat 
scandal. Tesco is a veritable illustrative case in this power dynamics as it stocks both food 
and non-food items within its portfolio (see Yamoah and Yawson, 2014; Spence and 
Bourlakis, 2009). 
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Overall this study explores, on the one hand, the power symmetry and/ relationships between 
supermarkets (e.g. Tesco) and their suppliers (e.g. Comigel), and highlights, on the other 
hand, the role that the power imbalance precipitated by the sole supplier-many buyer 
relationships in the food retail sector played in causing the infamous horsemeat scandal. 
Following this opening section, we undertake a literature review of key studies starting with 
Emerson (1962) through Milles and Snow (2007), Hingley (2005) to and ultimately 
Touboulic et al. (2014). This section is further split into the conceptual review and 
proposition development sections. The paper concludes in the final section. 
  
Background of the European Horsemeat Scandal 
Probably having existed for much longer, the “horsemeat scandal” that engulfed at least four 
countries in Europe (Great Britain, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, France, Romania and 
Spain), only came to light in January 2013 when the Irish Food Safety Authority (IFSA) 
found traces of horse DNA in beef burgers sold by “trusted” European supermarket chains. 
While there have been conflicting reports on the intent and purpose of such huge 
proportion, the mislabelling of beef products forced over a dozen retail giants to recall 
affected products following a revelation that the stock contained more than 10% horse 
DNA. As part of the investigation process, it came to light that all of the affected retailers 
relied on a single source of supply – France’s Comigel (see Yamoah and Yawson, 
2014; Madichie, 2015; Barnett et al., 2016). This arguably sole or single supply, was also 
found to engage with, and rely upon, the services of lesser known sub-suppliers in parts of 
Eastern Europe (notably Spanghero in Spain and other Butchers in Romania). According to 
the Agence France-Presse (AFP), Comigel is a single supplier of products to customers in 16 
countries – including Britain, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and France (Madichie, 2015). 
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In a bid to trace the origin of the crisis, the Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI) 
in January 2013, found that ten out of 27 hamburger products analysed contained horse DNA 
with 23 of these products testing positive for pig DNA. In one sample from the UK 
supermarket giant, Tesco, the horsemeat contaminant accounted for about 29% of the 
supposed beef burger (see Madichie, 2015). This revelation led to a barrage of product recalls 
in the ensuing six months or so – indeed  the UK regulatory body (the Food Safety Authority 
or FSA), confirmed that Dutch supermarket chains such as PLUS and Boni, had withdrawn 
their Primafrost brand lasagne from their shelves as a pre-emptive measure pending 
further investigation. Similar product recalls followed suit in places such as France, 
where Findus also withdrew three ready-prepared dishes – Lasagna Bolognese, Shepherd’s 
pie and Moussaka, as a result of horsemeat contamination in its products. Six other big 
French retailers (Auchan, Casino, Carrefour, Cora, Picard and Monoprix), also recalled their 
products. In Sweden, key players such as Axfood, Coop and ICA also recalled meat products 
from their shelves due to the possibility of contamination. 
As further investigation continued and the police became involved, a series of factors 
started to emerge from gross negligence in the strategic partnerships and/ or Business-to-
Business relationships to allegations of greed and ultimately fraud. In addition to these 
possibilities one could argues that the existing power imbalance, skewed power dependency 
and/ or asymmetry and the largely laid-back attitude towards the dictates of social exchange 
(drawing upon the social exchange theory and its main proponents), cumulatively incubated 
the crisis. For the purpose of this paper our focus would be on the latter as neither the legal 
investigation, three years on, has led to any notable conviction for fraud, nor has any 
consumer rights group pin-pointed unethical behaviour. 
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Literature Review 
Given the critical role of power dependence in supply chain relationships management 
(Kähkönen, 2014; Davis and Cobb, 2010; Bowman et al., 2013; Terpend and Krause, 2015; 
Chung et al., 2011; Maglaras et al., 2015; Nyaga et al., 2013; Hingley, 2005; Cox et al., 
2005; Fearne et al., 2005) it is surprising that little attention has been paid to the nature of 
mutual dependence between single-supplier-multiple-buyer relationships especially in 
situations where major retailers are the weaker partners (see Geyskens et al. 1998, 1999; 
Duarte and Davies, 2004; Leat and Revoredo-Giha, 2008; Madichie, 2015).  
According to Emerson (1962, p.31) power is ‘the property of social relation’ and only 
exist in reference to the dependency of the other partner. Hence, mutual dependence drives 
the behaviour of partners and determines the direction of the relationship. Invariably, the 
nature and direction of power dependence relation dictates the appropriate balancing process 
to be adopted. Emerson suggests four types of processes that can be used singly or in a 
combination to rebalance a relationship. A typology of balancing processes by Emerson 
includes: motivational withdrawal by weaker partner; cultivation of alternative social 
relations by the weaker member; increasing the motivational investment of the stronger 
partner in the relationship; and finally, a coalition of weaker partners against the stronger 
partner (see Emerson, 1962, p.35).  Such balancing operations specifically explain why and 
how power exercised by one partner due to resources and size, in a relationship of mutual 
dependence should be countered by weaker partner(s) (Emerson, 1962). However, this 
balancing act must lead to enhanced resource utilising to reduce risks and costs of business 
(Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Beyond Emerson’s (1962) ground breaking exposition on power dependence, Miles 
and Snow (2007) through a comprehensive review of supply chain management literature 
spanning over three decades underlined its evolution and identified three historical periods 
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regarding the changing organisational theory. In their classification, these authors considered 
the first period of the evolution in supply chain management as being characterised by 
pursuing operational efficiency as a strategic choice. The second period which is akin to the 
resource based theoretical perspective witnessed a change of focus from efficiency to 
effectiveness. The final and current era is premised on a knowledge management theoretical 
perspective that uses a multi-firm network to explore continuous innovation across various 
industries (see Miles and Snow, 2007).  
The generalisability of the changing organisation theories that has accompanied 
supply chain management evolution as proposed by Miles and Snow (2007) across industries 
is questioned, when for instance the food industry arguably normally seeks to be more 
efficient (Robson and Rawnsley, 2001; Howe, 1998). This is particularly evident as a result 
of major retailers controlling the exchange relationship in the food supply chains (Hingley, 
2005). The food industry may not yet be at the level of exploiting networks to explore 
continuous innovation, but it could aspire to incorporate the ideas and expertise of their 
suppliers and partners into the management of the supply chain (Miles and Snow (2007). 
The mainstream view has been that food supplier-retailer relationship is characterised 
with conflicts and opportunism where major retailers exploit the mutual dependence relation 
to their advantage (Chung et al., 2011; Viitaharju and Lähdesmäki, 2012). It is however very 
instructive to realise that retailers are sometimes the weaker partners as it was in the case of 
the meat supply chain between Comigel and their European partners in the single supplier-
multiple buyer relationship (Madichie, 2015). The unfavourable point of view of the role of 
power in supply chain relationships is by no means universal (Hingley, 2005). However, a 
strand of the supply chain management literature suggests that power dependence is a major 
cause of instability in supply chain relationships and there is a need to restore balance in 
favour of the weaker partner (Emerson, 1962; Nyaga et al., 2013; Maglaras et al., 2015). 
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Indeed, power asymmetry between suppliers and retailers (Hingley, 2005; Kumar et al., 
1998; Belaya and Hanf, 2009) influences and exacerbates the risk exposure and acts as a key 
determinant of success of supply chain stakeholders within the food industry (Hingley, 2005). 
In the food category, the power relations and or dependencies between single suppliers and 
multiple buyers has been scantily investigated (see for example, Geyskens et al. 1998, 1999; 
Duarte and Davies, 2004; Leat and Revoredo-Giha, 2008; Madichie, 2015). The specific case 
illustration of the business practices of food retail giants and/ or supermarket chains such as 
Tesco (Britain’s largest grocery chain); Auchan, Casino, Carrefour, Cora, Picard, Monoprix 
(in France); as well as PLUS and Boni (in the Netherlands) – have been demonstrated as 
being fallible (see Madichie, 2015) especially in the aftermath of the horsemeat scandal.  
The implications of this fallibility has been found to be contingent upon the perceived 
over reliance on a single or limited number of suppliers (and their sub-contractual deals), 
which might have been complicit in the breakdown of relationships and/ or organizational 
trust. While this may be partially explained using the social exchange theory (Cropanzano 
and Mitchell, 2005; Tasselli, Kilduff, and Men, 2015), the power-dependency theory may 
well be more expedient (see Hingley, 2005). As Meehan and Wright (2012, p. 669) point out, 
“who, or what, holds power in business-to-business buyer–seller relationships is a debate at 
the heart of power theory.” Indeed the power imbalance in such relationships (Touboulic, 
Chicksand, and Walker, 2014) may have implications on the nature and level of 
collaborations (Kahkonen, 2014). 
As a result of the recent ‘horsemeat scandal’ (see Barnett et al., 2016; Madichie, 
2015; Falkheimer and Heide, 2015; Yamoah and Yawson, 2014), the search for alternatives 
to the conventional supply chain (e.g. the halal supply chain) has started to gain traction with 
the surge in the Muslim customer base and dollar, and the resurgence of desacrilisation 
(marketing to non-Muslim consumers) – based on trust or a breach thereof, as well as 
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traceability issues arising from relationships between multiple buyers and single suppliers 
(see Madichie, 2015; Barnajee et al., 2003; Chiou et al., 2007; Free, 2008; Karabati and 
Sayin, 2008); food neophobia (Flight et al., 2003; Bonne and Verbeke, 2006; Verbeke and 
Ward, 2006) and trust (Ekici, 2013; Gray et al., 2013) in food supply chains. 
 
A Conceptual review of single supplier/ multiple retailer relationships  
A critical observation of the extant literature on power relationships within supply chains 
spanning two decades reveals varied positions have been articulated by supply chain 
management researchers (see Cox et al., 2005; Hingley, 2005; Davis and Cobb, 2010; Chung 
et al., 2011; Bowman et al., 2013; Marshall and Ambrose, 2013; Kähkönen, 2014; Maglaras 
et al., 2015; Terpend and Krause, 2015).  
One school of thought is the suggestion of a positive presence of stronger industry 
players within specific supply chains who are credited with maintaining stability of the chain 
by way of resource provision and weaker players play by the rule set by the more powerful 
players (Cox et al., 2005; Hingley, 2005). A contrary alternative view is that supplier-retailer 
relationship is prone to destructive conflicts and lack of mutual collective orientation and as 
such stronger partners exploit power dependence to their benefit (Viitaharju and Lähdesmäki, 
2012; Chung et al., 2011). Proponents of this detrimental position such as Caniëls and 
Gelderman (2007), Crosno and Dahlstrom (2008), and Chicksand (2015), point to situations 
where weaker partners have to foot the bill for doing business with their powerful partners as 
exemplar practices that support their point of view.  
Another school of thought observed within the existing literature holds that power 
asymmetry within supply chains precipitates a dependency syndrome that generates 
vulnerability and mistrust that requires stakeholder intervention (Marshall and Ambrose, 
2013; Maglaras et al., 2015). It can be inferred from these strands of supply chain literature 
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adduced to above that the persistence of power imbalance over a relatively long period could 
result into dependency, vulnerability, mistrust and instability.   
Notwithstanding the clear articulation of the respective positions, power imbalance 
between suppliers and retailers (Kumar et al., 1998; Hingley, 2005; Belaya and Hanf, 2009) 
thrives and influences the degree of vulnerability or success of supply chains (Hingley, 
2005). However, there is limited literature on the nature of power dynamics between single 
supplier-multiple buyer relationships where major retailers are the weaker partners as it 
persisted within the meat supply chain in Europe that suffered the humiliation of the 
infamous horsemeat scandal.  
A middle line position also exists in the literature on supply chain relationships. On 
this front, a considerable number of studies suggest that both co-operation and conflict exist 
together between weaker and stronger partners as well as equal partners within the supply 
chain (Barlow et al., 1997; Collins and Burt, 2003; Belaya and Hanf, 2009). This is an 
emerging school of thought that advocates for a continuous balancing act to surmount 
conflicts and disagreements to maintain the integrity of supply chain exchange relationships 
(Chung et al., 2011; Kalafatis, 2000; Terpend and Krause, 2015). Given the strengths and 
limitations of these existing paradigms in supply chain relationships, perhaps, there is a 
potential benefit to be explored by approaching power relationship challenges in the 
particular case of this paper, framed as a study with a conceptual review based on a single 
case study involving multiple stakeholders from a multi-theory perspective. 
 
Proposition Development 
The over reliance on a single supplier, Comigel, for fresh meat in most European meat retail 
operations (Levs and Nyberg, 2013) including the likes of the UK supermarket giant, Tesco 
(see Madichie, 2015) may have accentuated the break down in the supply chain in that region 
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due to the power asymmetry existent in such relationships.  Taking a cue from Hingley 
(2005) and especially on the key facets proposed in that study, we argue that the misuse of 
power can be detrimental to supply chain relationships (see Johnsen and Ford, 2002; Kumar 
et al., 1998). In his study on power imbalanced relationships, Hingley (2005) used cases from 
UK fresh food suppliers to support an earlier contention that exploiting power asymmetry in 
relationships is more conventional than co-operation and power symmetry (Campbell 1997; 
Blois, 1998; Campbell, 1997; Earp et al., 1999; Kalafatis, 2000; Svensson, 2001). However, 
Hingley concludes that ‘striving for self-interest does not preclude organisations acting in a 
co-operative manner and co-operative and competitive business strategies can co-exist 
alongside one another […] they are not polar opposites’ (Hingley, 2005, p.563).   
In the instance of the power dependence within the meat supply chain prior to the 
horsemeat scandal in Europe, which was characterised by single supplier-multiple retailer 
relationships, we highlight the traditional principles of supply chain relationships, where 
relationships are built on a competitive basis, even sometime adversarial, and stakeholders 
seeks to “purchase as cheaply and sell as expensively as possible” (see, Lev and Pirog, 2013, 
p. 2).  Thus, a single supplier, in a bid to cut cost, introduced ‘cheaper ingredient’ (i.e. 
horsemeat) to offer ‘good deals’ for retailers who did not have alternative supply sources, 
even if they knew about the adulteration (i.e. mislabelling). We argue that while the scandal 
may be attributable to a multifaceted number of explanations such as greed, or the need for 
survival, power asymmetry could have further compounded the problem. This leads to our 
first proposition. 
 
P1: Power asymmetry/ imbalance contributed to a supplier culture that tolerated unethical 
decision making which might have served as a catalyst for the horsemeat scandal. 
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In the light of the above, we seek to extrapolate the power dependency theory as a means of 
explaining what went wrong leading up to the horsemeat crisis. Although Madichie (2015) 
drawing from media reports, did suggest some element of fraudulent activity, we opine that 
such instances can only be accentuated in the absence of trust amongst supplier chain 
partners. Such aspects of trust or distrust arguably thrives on an existing power asymmetry, as 
evident largely in the power-dependency literature (see Hogg et al. 1996; Kumar et al., 1998; 
Earp et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 1999; Collins and Burt, 1999; Hogarth-Scott, 1999; 
Siemieniuch et al., 1999; Egan, 2000; Matanda et al., 2001; Christopherson and Coath, 2002; 
Johnsen and Ford, 2002; O’Keefe and Fearne, 2002; Fearne et al., 2005), and to some extent, 
the social exchange theory (see Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; Tasselli, Kilduff and Men, 
2015). This leads to the second contribution of the study – notably how future recurrence of 
the saga may be forestalled.  With particular reference to Madichie (2015) on the horsemeat 
scandal, we posit that the power dynamics (which we attribute to the power dependency 
theory) at play at the time was due to the imbalance in the relationship between the single 
supplier-multiple buyer.  From the review of the power dependency literature, we take a cue 
from Hingley, (2005, p. 563) and especially on the key facets proposed in that study that:  
There is no doubt that the abuse of power is a destructive force, but the exercise 
of power in asymmetric relationships is more typical state than the existence of 
perpetual co-operation and power symmetry. However, striving for self-interest 
does not preclude organisations acting in a co-operative manner.  
 
The above discussion served as the context for exploring the European horsemeat scandal in 
the light of stakeholder involvement (including the retailers, suppliers and regulatory 
agencies) in a bid to forestall future recurrence. Drawing on the extant literature particularly 
Emerson (1962) and Miles and Snow (2007), three suggestions may be advanced thus: (i) the 
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12 
need to alter the current power dynamics by coordination and collaborations; (ii) need to 
explore a diversified supplier sources (same as the present supplier but many of them) to alter 
power balance and build trust; and (iii) to seek exclusively sustainable and traceable supplier 
sources that use their sourcing credibility as their main unique selling points. Specifically, 
altering current power dynamics and exploring diversified supplier sources, as well as 
sustainable sourcing by retailers within the meat supply chain, may bring about withdrawal of 
dependency motivation (Emerson, 1962) and shift from efficiency to effectiveness (Miles and 
Snow, 2007). Implementing these suggestions is envisaged as a credible approach to 
exploiting social exchange theory through coordination and collaborations to alter the 
traditional power-dependence perspective. This leads to our second proposition. 
 
P2: Power sharing and social exchange theory can help forestall recurrence of a supplier 
culture that tolerates unethical decision making to prevent similar scandals happening in 
future. 
 
Similarly Touboulic et al., (2014) adopted “a power perspective to investigate sustainable 
supply chain relationships and specifically used resource-dependence theory analyse buyer–
supplier–supplier relationships. According to them, such an approach provides understanding 
into how big firms cooperate with small and medium size enterprises to implement 
sustainable practices – including how power can be managed to facilitate or inhibit effective 
cooperation for sustainability between a multinational company and agricultural growers in 
the UK food industry (see Touboulic et al, 2014, p. 577). 
Drawing from Levs and Hayberg (2013) and Madichie’s (2015) single supplier – 
multiple buyers’ frameworks, we highlight the power asymmetry that could arise from such 
unbalanced relationships (see Figure 1). Indeed it is arguable that power derives from the 
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perception of indispensability as there are not plausible alternative suppliers. While Comigel 
had blamed Spanghero, a French meat-processing company, the latter blamed Romanian 
abattoirs for sourcing meat from traders in Cyprus and the Netherlands (see Cullinane, 2013; 
Madichie, 2015, p.70).  But Romania’s Prime Minister reportedly argued that the two 
Romanian slaughterhouses initially suspected of having links to the horsemeat scandal, never 
had direct contact with Comigel and had done nothing illegal (Madichie, 2015).  
 
FIGURE 1.  
Power Dependency in Single Supplier/ Multiple Buyers 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Madichie (2015: 65) 
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Indeed Touboulic et al., (2014) explored the resource-dependence theory along these lines – 
that is, buyer-supplier-supplier relationships and highlighted potential elements of power 
asymmetry in the relationship between the Goliaths (large retailers) and the Davids (SME 
suppliers), which could quite easily “hinder effective cooperation” in the supply chain. 
According to Touboulic et al., (2014, p. 577) there is a need to show the effects of power 
dependence on the implementation of sustainability initiatives within supply chains. 
A key lesson from the above exposition is that risk needs to be jointly managed in 
order to curb potential channel or supply chain conflicts. As Hingley (2005, p. 553) points 
out, “when one party is threatened by the balance of power, that weaker party will be more 
likely to seek alternative alliances.” Hingley further opines that, “the issue of building, 
lasting, meaningful and workable relationships where power imbalance and power 
dependency are ever present is highly pertinent to the study of food industry supply chain 
relationships” (Hingley, p. 556). 
Hittle and Leonard (2011, p. 1182) also point out, through a qualitative analysis, the 
key characteristics in supply chain crises. The most common was dependence on a sole 
supplier amongst others such as poor relationships with suppliers and risk management. Prior 
studies have also debated the issue in relation to accounting and trust (Free, 2008) as well as 
coordination incorporating buyers’ expectations under information sharing (see Karabati and 
Sayin, 2008). It is in the light of this that we posit that redressing the imbalance arising from 
the power asymmetry could mean aligning the concept with the social exchange theory 
(Emerson, 1976; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; Cook et al., 2013).   
Citing Moustafa (2006), Hittle and Leonard (2011, p.1190) points out successful 
examples of supply chain management strategies, and this included capacity flexibility, 
multiple suppliers and proactive risk management. Tactically, adopting capacity flexibility 
approach in a stable non-crisis period does not make business sense. But judging from the 
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history of supply chain driven crises and the potential for a recurrence in future makes 
adopting such a proactive strategy to maintain capacity flexibility and use multiple supplier 
could prove very critical for long term business success. The globalised nature of modern 
businesses has several effects on supply chains (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). By stretching 
supply chains across borders, any small mistake or interruption along the way can easily 
become a crisis (Tsiakouri, 2008). Additionally, with increased global competition, recovery 
from a supply chain crisis is challenged by the ease with which business partners customers 
can switch to a competitor (see Hittle and Leonard, 2011, p. 1183).  
In their study nearly a decade ago, Karabatı and Sayın (2008, p.747) assumed that the 
supplier engages in vertical information sharing with his buyers with the goal of coordinating 
the supply chain. In situations of vertical information sharing, the upstream (i.e supplier) 
and downstream (i.e buyers) participants of the supply chain share information on a one-on-
one basis, and the supplier does not share a buyer’s private information with others. This 
leads to the case where the supplier has access to the complete information set that is required 
to coordinate the supply chain, and, although each buyer has access to the supplier’s set up 
and holding cost information, individual buyers do not have access to the supplier’s 
information set that contains information on other buyers. We also assume that the supplier 
and the buyers will be honest (and trustworthy) in information sharing, because of the long-
term nature of the relationship or contractual ties. As Czinkota et al. (2014: 98) point out:  
“… Positive collaboration experience and ‘functional’ Trust Supporting 
Czinkota’s view and relating to relationship related risks, Fischer (2013) defines 
two levels of trust in the agri-food supply chain. He labels the most important 
trust determinants in this context as ‘effective communication and positive 
collaboration experience’.  At retailers’ and processors’ level, relationships tend 
to be more formalized, with larger use of contracts. The reason appears to lie in 
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the fact that retailers deal with many and large corporations. On the other hand, 
processors and farmer relationships appear to rely more on trust, due to the 
representatives of each group tending to know each other from dealing in the 
local and regional markets.”  
 
The possibility of the buy-local campaign has already started to manifest. As reported by 
White (The Telegraph, 21 January 2014):  
Yorkshire Dales Meat Company, which supplies restaurants, hotels, food pubs the 
catering trade and supermarket ASDA, has seen a 20pc increase in sales over the 
last 12 months. Based on its own farm in Wensleydale the father-son-team 
Stephen and James Knox set up shop in 2004 as a way of marketing and selling 
his own brand of meat. The pair put the figures down to consumers looking to buy 
meat - and, in particular, beef - from trusted sources since the beginning of the 
horsemeat scandal.  
 
While Fischer (2013) holds that trust is needed when there are possible risks involved, it 
could, vice versa, be argued that for a food supply chain to be secure and safe, it must rely 
little on a dysfunctional connotation of trust. By the same token, a food supply chain that 
relies heavily on trust among its actors implies existing issues of safety and security. In the 
event of any imbalance in this relationship, the asymmetry question is bound to arise – be it 
information asymmetry or power asymmetry. Our main focus in this study, however, lies in 
the exploration of the power asymmetry being skewed against the retailer (typically big or 
large supermarket chains) as opposed to the supplier (usually smaller players). We also 
propose to highlight the role of power asymmetry in the formulation of strategy leading to 
effective risk management practices in supply chains. We argue, therefore, that the 
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breakdown in the meat supply chain can be explained in the light of the prevalent power 
imbalance in the relationships (see Figure 1) between European retailers such as Tesco, 
Auchan, Boni and Plus amongst others vis-à-vis a single supplier such as Comigel, and 
perhaps suppliers-supplier (see Karabati and Sayin, 2008) such as Spanghero and other 
unknown Romanian small-time players (Madichie, 2015).  
From the review of the literature dating back to the 1960s (see Emerson 1962; 
Hingley 2005; Miles and Snow 2007; Touboulic, Chicksand and Walker, 2014) we posit that 
channel conflicts such as the horsemeat scandal (irrespective of cause – fraud, greed, 
negligence or unethical behaviour), on the one hand, is attributable to power asymmetry in 
supply chain relationships. On the other hand, an understanding, and leveraging of, the power 
dependence theory can help forestall future recurrence. As a consequence, this study seeks to 
establish the link between power asymmetry and the horsemeat scandal, and thereby, suggest 
that formalised contractual ties and the facilitation of buy-in may mitigate any oversight and 
raise alarm bells before a full-blown crisis arises. 
 
Limitations 
There are numerous angles that could have been explored in the course of this study. First, 
the overreliance on a single even such as the horsemeat scandal can only mean that the 
arguments advanced in the study may not apply to other events in other sectors e.g. 
automotive or grocery sectors. Secondly, the qualitative anchor undertaken may be 
questioned in terms of validated. Perhaps if a survey had been conducted, this might have 
helped in mitigating this limitation. Further studies eliciting the views of key industry 
practitioners who were directly in charge of the management of the exchange relationships 
within the supply chain at the time of the scandal’s announcement, will serve as useful 
empirical test for the propositions of this study.  Such a study can also potential help unearth 
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the specific operational factors that led to the unethical decision that culminated in the meat 
adulteration.  
Perhaps in addition to the contribution of power asymmetry in understanding what 
went wrong and how this might be prevented from recurring, some consideration of 
information asymmetry (see Lee and Whang, 1999; Corbett and De Groote, 2000; Reuer and 
Koza, 2000; Agrell, Lindroth and Norrman, 2004; Fiala, 2005a, 2005b; Sahin and Robinson, 
2005; Yue and Raghunathan, 2007) might have been also worthy of consideration. Indeed the 
horsemeat scandal might have been purely driven by greed, which may also happen in 
instances where there are multiple suppliers. As suggested by one of the reviewers for this 
study, “there would be an argument that multiple suppliers with lower power could be even 
more likely to make unethical decisions to survive in a low-margin environment.” Indeed 
Barnett et al. (2016) recently pointed out that “rebuilding consumer confidence in processed 
meat products following a food adulteration episode is a multifaceted and difficult process.”  
Another interesting issue which may be considered in more detail is that of 
overcoming the supplier-buyer information imbalance. In the light of this we again agree with 
Barnett et al. (2014) on the need for all parties to “improve their communication strategies 
during future food adulteration incidents.” This is perhaps where the information asymmetry 
option may become ever more significant, especially due to the crisis being possible in the 
absence of the suggested power asymmetry considered in this study. We also welcome the 
authors’ call for a newly to-be-established marketing stream – ‘Sustainable and Curative 
Marketing’ (see Czinkota, Kaufmann and Basile, 2014). Another weakness of the study 
might be linked to its focus on the retail side involving the relationship between retailers and 
their suppliers and little attention to the consumer side of the event in question. This is 
another instance of information sharing whose corollary is information asymmetry. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
The primary aim of this study was to explore the contributory role of power asymmetry in 
what has now been labelled the European horsemeat scandal. In so doing the study draws 
upon both the power-dependency and social exchange theories to highlight the implications 
of the supplier-retailer power imbalance with implications for food supply chain 
management. Using a case illustration of the European horsemeat scandal some explanations, 
and preventive measures going forward, are advanced. Indeed the analytical interrogation of 
the power asymmetry in the relationship between supermarkets (e.g. multiple retail giants 
such as Tesco) and their single meat supplier, Comigel, highlights the extent of retailer 
vulnerability. As a consequence, a general understanding, and leveraging of the power 
dependence theory can help forestall future recurrence. Ultimately by extrapolating the power 
dependency and social exchange theories as a way of explaining what went wrong in the 
horsemeat saga, and more importantly, how future recurrence may be forestalled, the study 
brings some value to the supply chain management table for future research directions.  
A similar pattern on balance reliance on single supplier can be gleaned from the 
automotive industry where suppliers of safety gear include behemoths such as Sweden’s 
Autoliv and Japan’s Takata. Arguably in situations where one supplier falls foul of the law or 
gets embroiled in a scandal, this affords the retailer the opportunity to switch – a move that 
may only be possible in instances where there is a pot of suppliers to pick from rather than 
the existing single-supplier. According to Hellstrom (Automotive News, November 11, 2015) 
–  Autoliv is the world’s top maker of equipment such as airbags and seat belts, but it has 
struggled to break the ties between Japanese carmakers and main supplier Takata in a 
country where the ‘keiretsu’ corporate culture sees businesses closely bound together in 
relationships cultivated over decades. 
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The study has numerous implications for at least three audiences – research and scholarship, 
policy and managerial. First, for academic researchers there might be some opportunity to 
subject the current observations and/or findings to hypothesis testing; considering other 
concepts such as information asymmetry; reconsidering the causal relationships - be it the 
independent-dependent-moderating variables (unethical behaviour, greed, fraud, power 
asymmetry, information asymmetry, negligence, partner buy-in etc.) Second, from a policy 
side there have been calls for better coordination of the regulatory bodies (notably the FSA in 
the UK and FSAI in Ireland). There are also calls for investment in detection technology – 
with a zone of tolerance for mishaps pitched at acceptable 1% less than 1% levels (see 
Premanandh, 2013) – to constitute pre-meditated fraud. What is the. Needless to add that 
there have been similar crises in the past including horsemeat (new even in the 
Netherlands) and the BSE crisis in Europe. 
Thirdly, and as far as managerial implications are concerned there have been 
suggestions for vertical integration in the supply chain rather than using single suppliers 
doing business with multiple larger buyers (see the case of UK supermarket, Asda, as 
reported in White, 2014). There are also issues related to formalising contractual ties rather 
than leaving these loose. Indeed similar concerns can be seen in the Garment industry (see for 
example, Hoque, Sinkovics and Sinkovics, 2016) and the Automotive industry (Takata is still 
in the news over its airbag crisis - one the brink of packing up or as the media put it ‘closing 
shop’, BBC News Live, 11 May 2016). There are also issues around the length of the supply 
chain and issues of coordination. 
The practical advice would be to take initiative in the management of partner 
relations. Irrespective of the balance of power relations, information sharing and management 
always have a key role to play. Furthermore there is a need for continuous monitoring, 
evaluation and even renegotiation of contractual agreements (see, for example, Corbett, and 
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Tang, 1999). Indeed our study resurrects an issue that has a longer history than many 
researchers, managers, and policy makers realise – the horsemeat scandal has a long history, 
and just like the Ebola virus in Africa (see Madichie, 2017), there are possibilities of a 
recurrence. As a clear illustration of this we draw attention to a study undertaken over four 
decades ago in which Anderson and Lee (1976) investigated the phenomenon in a study on 
“source of contamination of horsemeat in a packing plant under federal inspection.” Like 
many other scandals now adopting the “gate” suffix – see Abbots and Coles, 2013 for a paper 
exploring the “Horsemeat-gate” – the issue remains a danger going forward, and thereby 
constituting a wakeup call for, especially the regulatory authorities (Premanandh, 2013). This 
is in addition to a more recent study, which explored consumers’ confidence, reflections and 
response strategies following the horsemeat incident, and highlighted the complexities within 
it, “rebuilding consumer confidence in processed meat products following a food adulteration 
episode is a multifaceted and difficult process [but called upon] Food authorities and the food 
industry […] to improve their communication strategies during future food adulteration 
incidents” (see Barnett et al., 2016: 721)  
Furthermore, and from a global implications perspective on how what obtains in 
Europe matters for the rest of the world, a recent article in China Daily (see Chi-Ping, 2011) 
attributed “food safety problem is a global issue.” This is a point that resonated with 
O’Mahony’s (2013) more recent article entitled “Finding horse meat in beef products—a 
global problem.” Interestingly research students have also become engaged with the 
developments in this area as a Doctoral dissertation at the Kansas State University seems to 
confirm. In that study, Kulas (2014) explored the “policy responses to reduce the opportunity 
for horsemeat adulteration fraud: the case of the European Union.” Czinkota, Kaufmann and 
Basile (2014: 91) on their part, called for “a newly to-be-established marketing stream we 
call ‘Sustainable and Curative Marketing.”  
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Our discussions in this study would, hopefully, help practitioners searching for the ways to 
develop the protection of food supply chains from further scandals seek out preventive 
measure and/ or actionable solutions. Thus, the further research may include the development 
and testing of propositions resulting in actual techniques of increasing trust along the supply 
chain and making it more transparent on a global scale.  
In the light of these discussions we rely on the experience of Duncan McNair, a 
solicitor and Chairman of the McNair Inquiry and Repots, and who having chaired an 
independent review commissioned by the RSPCA into Freedom Food, the leading farmed 
animal welfare assurance scheme, boasting the former Environment Secretary, and Professor 
David Main, a distinguished academic veterinarian. As an outcome of that review, McNair 
(2014) reported that nothing had happened prevention-wise. He, therefore, argued that “only 
a root and branch overhaul of the regulatory system will enable consumers to trust what they 
are told they are eating.” In other words, trust will not be restored without the key wider 
issues – notably, scrutiny of absurdly long supply chains, the activities of food processing 
companies, the continuing entrenchment of power with the big retailers, the supermarkets’ 
and regulators’ ongoing failure to identify numerous instances of food adulteration, and lack 
of vigilance as to animal welfare in food production - being rigorously investigated. 
Openness and transparency between retailers and consumers as to farming methods are the 
key to restoring public confidence. In place of the FSA, a new and properly resourced body is 
needed committed to enhancing consumer safety and animal welfare in the food industry, 
focusing on transparency and accountability in the supply chain and intelligible labelling of 
animal products; with a wide remit to licence, regulate, discipline, investigate and prosecute 
and to recommend standards. There are also reputational issues for international businesses to 
think about especially where their legitimacy is called to question. During the past decades 
the food industry in Europe has become extensively complex and internationalized. Despite 
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the existence of an abundant body of laws and principles governing it, the increasing scale 
and the intricacies of the food supply chain resulted in a variety of dysfunctions. The horse 
meat scandal casts a cloud on both consumerism related topics and on commercial damage 
inflicted on manufacturer and retail brand equity (Czinkota et al., 2014: 99). 
Overall this study presents a comprehensive literature study on the power dependence 
and successfully links a power asymmetry in a food supply chain with the 2013 horsemeat 
scandal. The propositions derived from the literature review cover both: the causes of the 
European horsemeat scandal and the possible way for the avoiding the repetition of the same 
scale scandal. Usage of the extensive literature base from the theoretical and practical origins 
justifies well the applicability of the power asymmetry framework to the horsemeat scandal. 
Obviously, this article widely contributes to the research on supply chains and overall 
understanding of the ‘soft underbelly’ of the global food industry system. 
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